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Abstract
This paper examines the eﬀect of trust in a micro-economic environment, where
trust is clearly exogenous. Using a hand-collected data on European venture capital,
we show that the Eurobarometer measure of trust among nations significantly aﬀects
investment decisions. This holds even after controlling for investor and company fixed
eﬀects, geographic distance, information and transaction costs. The national identity
of venture capital firms’ partners is shown to matter for the eﬀect of trust. We also
considers the relationship between trust and sophisticated contracts involving contin-
gent control rights. We find trust and sophisticated contracts to be complements, not
substitutes.
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“There are countries in Europe [...] where the most serious impediment to
conducting business concerns on a large scale, is the rarity of persons who
are supposed fit to be trusted with the receipt and expenditure of large sums of
money.” (John Stuart Mill)
1 Introduction
Intuitively, many economist recognize the importance of trust for economic transactions.
As part of the recent literature on “social capital,” the work of Knack and Keefer (1997),
Temple and Johnson (1998), and Zak and Knack (2001) establishes a positive relationship
between trust and economic growth. Yet, this macro-oriented literature struggles with
issues of endogeneity. A micro-based approach holds promise for a cleaner identification
of the eﬀect of trust on economic transactions.
In this paper we use micro data on venture capital investments, containing information
on how venture capital firms across Europe invest in companies that may be located in
the same or diﬀerent countries. We use the Eurobarometer measure of bilateral trust
among nations to examine two central issues: Does trust aﬀect the likelihood of making
an investment? And does trust aﬀect the contracts between investors and entrepreneurs?
We find that trust is an important determinant of venture capital investment decisions,
even after controlling for several other factors. Moreover, higher trust is associated with
more sophisticated contracts.
What do we mean by trust? The social capital literature conceptualizes trust as a
subjective belief about the likelihood that a potential trading partner will act honestly.
It is important to distinguish diﬀerent types of trust. In a recent survey article, Durlauf
and Fafchamps (2006) provide a useful distinction between generalized and personalized
trust. The former pertains to the preconceptions that people of one identifiable group have
for people from another identifiable group. The latter concerns the evolving relationship
between two specific agents. In this paper we only focus on generalized trust, so that we
are concerned with what might be considered cursory beliefs, generalizations about others,
even stereotypes. An important caveat is that our analysis does not consider personalized
trust, i.e., how individuals interact over time to build better economic relationships.
Why should trust matter? Economic theory provides a number of reasons why trust
should–or should not–matter. If agents have common priors and update them based
on the available information, then no systematic diﬀerences should persist at the level
of generalized trust (which, by construction, excludes private information). The problem
with this argument is that trust diﬀerentials are remarkably persistent. Diﬀerences in
subjective beliefs can thus be thought of as non-common priors (Morris (1995)). These
are likely to arise in situations where agents have little objective information, and thus rely
more on social cues for making decisions. Another line of argument is that even if trust
diﬀerences persist, they should not matter, because sophisticated investors can undo such
biases by taking advantage of arbitrage opportunities. An interesting counter-argument
to this is that lack of trust may be self-fulfilling, i.e., it may be explained by the existence
of multiple equilibria (Greif (1993)). Arbitraging trust diﬀerentials may not be feasible,
precisely because the other party has low trust. From this discussion it becomes also clear
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that from a theoretical perspective, any empirical eﬀect of trust neither proves nor refutes
irrational behavior.
Why study trust in the context of venture capital? First, venture capital provides a
useful testing ground for the eﬀects of trust because both sides of the above arguments
can be applied. On the one hand, one can reasonably argue that venture capitalists are
sophisticated investors who would not act upon poorly-informed priors, and who are well
positioned to exploit any arbitrage opportunities. On the other hand, one might argue
that the financing of new companies inherently involves limited hard information, high
(Knightian) uncertainty, and considerable scope for opportunistic behavior. Investors
may therefore be more prone to rely on soft information, including social beliefs such as
trust.
Second, the venture capital industry is tiny relative to the economy. According to the
European Venture Capital Association, total investments in venture capital (excluding
buyouts) accounted for less than 0.1% of European GDP in 2004. Venture capital activity
is clearly irrelevant to the formation of trust among nations. We thus have a setting where
we need not worry about reverse causality. Trust among nations can aﬀect individual
venture capital investments, but these investments do not have a reverse causality eﬀect
on trust among nations. This considerably helps with empirically identifying the eﬀects
of trust.
One challenge with venture capital is obtaining the data. We use a hand-collected
dataset on European venture capital investments for the period 1998-2001. It contains
investors and companies from all across Europe, providing rich variation in investment
patterns. It also contains unique and useful details, such as the precise geographic location
of every single company and investor, and information about investment contracts that
cannot be obtained from any of the publicly or commercially available database.
Given its subjective nature, it is appropriate to measure trust by surveying opinions.
We adopt the approach of Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2005) of using the Eurobarometer
survey data of bilateral trust among nations. This measure is based on how much citizens
of one country say they trust the citizens from all other European countries (including
their own). We use country fixed eﬀects for both investors and companies, so that all of
the analysis concerns diﬀerences in the relative trust among nations. We show that our
results are robust by exploring a variety of alternative approaches to measuring trust, such
as using a measure of trust which more closely reflects the socioeconomic profile of venture
capital investors, or considering trustworthiness instead of trust by looking at trust from
the company’s, rather than the investor’s, perspective.
Our econometric specification considers all potential matches between investors and
companies in our sample, and ask which matches are actually realized. Given that we
do not have a natural experiment, the main identification challenge is controlling for
omitted variable bias. Our micro-level data is rich enough to control not only for country
fixed eﬀects, but also for investor and even company fixed eﬀects. This eliminates a
large number of alternative interpretations. For example, our fixed eﬀects account for all
country-specific factors, such as regulation, taxes and any country-specific institutions.
They also account for diﬀerences in countries’ investment opportunities, and they take
care of any systematic diﬀerences in the quality of investors or companies across countries.
In fact, given our fixed eﬀects, the only variables that matter are relative (or so-called
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dyadic) measures between the investor and the company. Trust is obviously such a relative
measure. We are also able to calculate a very precise measure of geographic distance, that
is the actual kilometric distance between the investor’s and the company’s town.1 Another
important relative measure concerns the availability of information about other countries.
We measure the amount of information about foreign countries available through each
country’s business press. Another set of alternative explanations concern diﬀerences in
transaction and enforcement costs. For this, we consider measures of language overlap,
and similarity of legal systems.
A central result is that higher trust significantly increases the probability of realizing
an investment. The eﬀect of trust is economically large, and continues to hold across a
number of alternative specifications. For example, economists have argued that culture
may aﬀect economic outcomes through two main channels: beliefs (such as trust) and
taste-based preferences. In our context we can ask whether investors really invest in the
countries they trust, and not just the countries they like. We introduce two novel proxies
for taste-preferences among nations. The first is based on the flow of tourists across
countries, the second on voting patterns from the Eurovision Song Contest, a unique pan-
European cultural event. We find that the main eﬀect of trust survives against all of these
alternative explanations.
Another issue concerns the role of individuals within firms. Venture capital firms have
relatively simple decision-making structures, where the power to make investments resides
with a handful of partners. We ask whether the presence of foreign partners aﬀects the
firm’s investment decisions, and find that having a foreign partner from the same country
as the company increases the likelihood of investing. In addition, the presence of a foreign
partner from a third country where trust for the company’s countrymen is higher than in
the investor’s host country also facilitates making an investment.
Our data allows us to examine the relationship between trust and contracting prac-
tices, which had not previously been studied. We focus on the use of contingent control
rights. A large literature, based on information asymmetries, argues that sophisticated
contracts help making economic interactions possible (see Stiglitz (2004) for an overview).
The prior venture capital literature (Hellmann (2006), Kaplan and Strömberg (2003)) ar-
gues that sophisticated contracting clauses can be used to balance the interests of investors
and entrepreneurs, but that specifying and verifying these clauses can be challenging. We
consider two alternative hypotheses about the relationship between trust and these sophis-
ticated contracts. If sophisticated contracts help to overcome information asymmetries,
then trust and sophisticated contracts would be substitutes, but if trust is a requisite for
such contracts, then they would be complements. We examine a variety of contingent
control rights, and find that the eﬀect of trust on their use is positive and significant. This
supports the complements hypothesis, where trust is important for writing sophisticated
contracts.
Our paper builds on the seminal work of Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2005), which
establishes the importance of trust for trade and investment flows. We build on their
analysis in several important respects. First, their analysis remains at the macro level,
1Such precision allows us to avoid some of the measurement problems that have plagued the literature
on trade and geography, which typically uses a much coarser measure–the distance between capital cities
(Head and Mayer (2002), Helliwell and Verdier (2001)).
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i.e., at the level of country pairs. We are able to analyze micro data at the level of
individual investor-company pairs, which allows us to control for a comprehensive set
of alternative explanatory factors, and thus to better isolate the role of trust. Second,
because we focus on a small segment of the economy, we can safely eliminate any concerns
about the endogeneity of trust. We can thus bypass all the diﬃculties of having to find
appropriate instruments for the determinants of trust.2 Third, our analysis takes an
important additional step, examining not only whether transactions occur, but how they
are structured. This allows us to address questions about the relationship between trust
and contracts that are not addressed by Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales.
Our results naturally contribute to the broader literature on social capital (see Das-
gupta (2003), Durlauf and Fafchamps (2006) and Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2006) for
some recent surveys). Much of this literature has focussed on the importance of trust
in an environment in which there is little legal enforcement. For example, Neace (1999)
documents that entrepreneurs in the former Soviet republics consider trust a key criterion
for business success. Johnson, McMillan and Woodruﬀ (2002) show that well-functioning
courts are a prerequisite for entrepreneurs to trust and contract with external suppliers.
Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2004) show that social capital has a stronger eﬀect where
legal enforcement is low, and among less educated people. Our study shows that trust
may continue to play a role, even in the context of developed countries. Moreover, our
results suggest that even with good legal enforcement, people do not rely on sophisticated
contracting to overcome lack of trust.
Trust is also an important concept in the emerging behavioral finance literature. The
paper most closely related to our is Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2007), which documents
that trust aﬀects the willingness to invest money in the stock market. Guiso, Sapienza
and Zingales (2005) also explore how trust aﬀects portfolio investments across countries.
In a broader sense, our paper also contributes to research on the well-known ’home bias’
puzzle (French and Poterba (1991), Karolyi and Stulz (2003), Lewis (1999)).
This paper makes a novel contribution to the venture capital literature, introducing
trust as an important factor that has not been considered so far. The analysis builds on
a number of papers that explain the contractual features observed in venture capital. See
in particular Dessein (2005), Gompers (1997), Hellmann (1998, 2006), Hellmann and Puri
(2002), and Kaplan and Strömberg (2003, 2004). A recent spate of papers also examines
how legal systems influence venture capital contracts. See, in particular, Bottazzi, Da Rin
and Hellmann (2005), Cumming, Schmidt andWalz (2005), Kaplan, Martel and Strömberg
(2003), and Lerner and Schoar (2005). The analysis of these papers is orthogonal to ours,
in the sense that our fixed eﬀects already absorb all cross-country diﬀerences in legal
systems. That is, the eﬀects of trust observed in this paper go beyond diﬀerences in legal
systems. Finally, recent work by Hochberg, Ljungqvist and Lu (2006a,b) examines the
importance of social networks in venture capital.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 explains our data and
variables. Section 3 examines the eﬀect of investment formation. Section 4 examines the
eﬀect of trust on contracts. It is followed by a brief conclusion.
2Obviously our analysis cannot–and doesn’t try to–explain the formation of trust itself. See Alesina
and La Ferrara (2002) and Glaeser et al. (2000) for contributions to the analysis of this question.
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2 Data and variables
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for all the variables used in the analysis.
2.1 Data on venture investments
Our data come from a variety of sources. Our primary source is a survey of 750 venture
capital firms in the following seventeen European countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK. Venture firms were included in our
sample if they satisfied three conditions: (i) they were full members of the European
Venture Capital Association (EVCA) or of a national venture capital organization in 2001,
(ii) they were actively engaged in venture capital and (iii) they were still in operations in
2002.3
We asked each venture capital firm information about each first round of venture
financing they made between January 1998 and December 2001. The questions centered on
key characteristics of the venture firm and on their involvement with portfolio companies.
We also asked information on some characteristics of the firm’s venture partners and on
its portfolio companies.4
We received 124 usable responses, which we cross-checked using investor and company
websites, commercial databases (Amadeus, Worldscope, and VenturExpert), and trade
publications. For this paper we use data on 108 venture firms (and their portfolio com-
panies). Eight are from either Norway or Switzerland, countries for which there are no
available data on trust, and eight invested solely outside the European Union or provided
us with insuﬃcient information.
While there is some variation in response rates across countries, our data represent a
comprehensive cross-section which provides a good coverage of all countries, with an overall
response rate of nearly 16%. This response rate is significantly larger than the typical
response rate for comparable surveys of industrial firms, which is around 9% (see the
discussion by Graham and Harvey (2001)). No single country dominates the sample, and
no country is left out. Remarkably, the larger venture capital markets (France, Germany,
and the UK) show a response rate above 13%. Finally, our data are not dominated by
a few large respondents: the largest venture capital firm accounts for only 5% of the
observations, and the largest 5 venture capital firms for only 16% of the observations. In
Bottazzi, Da Rin and Hellmann (2005, 2006) we provide a more extensive discussion of the
data, and report some additional tests that confirm the representativeness of this sample.
3We excluded from our survey private equity firms that only engage in non-venture private equity deals
such as mezzanine finance, management buy-outs (MBOs) or leveraged buy-outs (LBOs), but we included
private equity firms that invest in both venture capital and non-venture private equity deals. For these, we
considered only their venture capital investments. See Fenn, Liang and Prowse (2003) for a discussion of
the structure of the private equity market.
4Throughout the paper we reserve the term ’firm’ for the investor (i.e., the venture capital firm) and
the term ’company’ to the company that receives the venture capital financing.
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2.2 Unit of observation
We adopt two units of observation. In the first part of the analysis, we focus on the
formation of deals. For this we construct the sample of all potential deals, consisting of
every possible pairing between investors which have responded to our survey and their
portfolio companies. The unit of observation is the individual investor-company pair (as
in Sørensen (2005)). We construct such pairs from the 108 venture firms and the 1,216
companies in our dataset. For each company we consider that it could in principle be
financed by any of the respondent venture firms. We also take into account that some
individual pairs are not potential deals because the venture capitalist began operations
after the date the company was seeking an investment. Our potential deals dataset includes
107,390 potential deals.
One obvious limitation of our analysis is that to be included in our sample, a company
must have received funding from at least one investor. We clearly cannot observe all the
’marginal’ companies that never received any funding from any venture capitalist.5 What
does it mean to exclude these marginal potential deals? Our analysis examines whether
trust aﬀects investment decisions among all ’infra-marginal’ companies. This excludes any
eﬀect that trust may have on the marginal companies. It is possible that higher levels
of trust increase the overall size of the venture capital market. In this case, it is likely
that our analysis understates the total eﬀect of trust. In fact, there is some evidence that
countries with higher level of trust have larger venture capital markets. Figure 1 shows
the positive relationship between the per-capita amount of (aggregate) venture capital
investment (in euros) and the level of trust received by each of our sample countries.
In the second part of the analysis we focus on the question of how trust aﬀects venture
capital contracts. For this part of the analysis we use what we call the realized deals
sample, which consists of all the actual investments that we observe in our data. Our
realized deals sample contains a total of 1,277 deals, into 1,216 companies, made by 108
venture capital firms. The reason there are more deals than companies is that 54 companies
receive financing from more than one of our venture investors.
2.3 Dependent variables
In the first part of the analysis we ask whether a particular investor finances a particular
company. The dependent variable is DEAL, which is a dummy variable that takes the
value 1 if the venture capital firm has invested in a particular company; 0 otherwise.
In the second part of the analysis we address the relation between trust and contracts.
For this we construct five dependent variables which capture the extent to which sophis-
ticated contracting is used in each deal. We consider four types of contingent control
rights, whereby the investor is granted the rights to certain actions in case the company
fails to meet specified performance targets. We look at the right to take control of the
board of directors, to obtain voting majority, to liquidate the company, and to fire the
founder/CEO (’termination’).
For contingent board rights, our survey instrument asked: Does your firm has a right
5Note that even if we did, their observations would fall out of the regression by the time we consider
the conditional logit model.
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to obtain control of the board of directors contingent on the realization of certain events?
(Possible answers were: Yes, No.). Based on this, CONTINGENT BOARD RIGHTS is a
dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the venture capital firm responded Yes, and 0 if
it responded No.
For contingent voting rights, our survey instrument asked: Does your firm has a right
to obtain voting rights contingent on the realization of certain events? (Possible answers
were: Yes, No.). Based on this, CONTINGENT VOTING RIGHTS is a dummy variable
that takes the value 1 if the venture capital firm responded Yes, and 0 if it responded No.
For contingent liquidation rights, our survey instrument asked: Does your firm has a
right to liquidate the company contingent on the realization of certain events? (Possible
answers were: Yes, No.). Based on this, CONTINGENT LIQUIDATION RIGHTS is a
dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the venture capital firm responded Yes, and 0 if
it responded No.
For contingent termination rights, our survey instrument asked: Does your firm has a
right to fire the founder/CEO contingent on the realization of certain events? (Possible
answers were: Yes, No.). Based on this, CONTINGENT TERMINATION RIGHTS is a
dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the venture capital firm responded Yes, and 0 if
it responded No.
Finally, we build an index measure of contingent control rights by summing over the
four contingent control dummies. This variable is called CONTINGENT CONTROL
RIGHTS, and takes value between 0 and 4.
2.4 Independent variables
2.4.1 Country-dyad level
Some of our dependent variables vary at a level that we call a ’country dyad,’ which is
the unique pair of an investor’s country and a company’s country. Table 2 shows the
correlation structure of the independent variables that vary at the country-dyad level.
Central to the analysis is our measure of trust. Our analysis is based on the Euro-
barometer measures of trust, previously used by Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2005), who
describe the Eurobarometer survey in detail. Eurobarometer is a large survey about the
social and political attitudes of citizens of the European Union. The survey is executed
periodically for the European Commission since 1970. Our trust measure is derived from
the Eurobarometer survey waves from 1990 to 1996. Note that we deliberately chose not
to collect trust data directly from our survey respondents, since such a measure would have
serious endogeneity problems. The Eurobarometer measures, on the contrary, have the
important advantage that they are clearly exogenous to the investments made by venture
capitalists.
Our trust variable is calculated by taking the responses to the following question: “I
would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in people from various
countries. For each, please tell me whether you have a lot of trust, some trust, not very
much trust or no trust at all.” The answers are coded over a scale from 1 (no trust at
all) to 4 (a lot of trust). TRUST is computed as the percentage of the individuals which
respond 4–i.e., that they trust a lot people from the other country.
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How reliable is this measure of trust? First, note that the bilateral nature of the
data distinguishes between being trusting and being trustworthy (see also Glaeser et. al.
(2000)). Second, the trust measure reflects many of the patterns one would intuitively ex-
pect: People typically have the highest trust for their own country; Scandinavian countries
receive a lot of trust and are also more trusting; the British trust the French less than
other nations; and the French are happy to reciprocate. We also examine how the Eu-
robarometer trust measure relates to the World Values Survey (WVS) measure of trust,
which has played a central role in the prior literature (Knack and Keefer (1997)).6 A
strong correlation between these two measures would suggest a reliable measurement of
trust that does not depend on the details of how the surveys were implemented. The
correlation coeﬃcient is 0.72, significant at the 1% level.7 Trust also shows a strong cor-
relation with two widely used index measures, corruption (0.47) and rule of law (0.55).8
This provides reassurance about the reliability of our trust measure.9
The remaining country-dyadic variables are the following. We consider three variables
that are standard controls in the literature on geography and trade, measuring whether a
pair is either located in the same country, or in neighboring countries, and how econom-
ically far away are two countries. Formally, FOREIGN—DEAL is a dummy variable that
takes the value 1 if the investor and company are from diﬀerent countries, 0 otherwise.
COMMON—BORDER is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if two countries share a
land border, 0 otherwise (including domestic deals). GDP—DIFFERENCE is the absolute
diﬀerence in the levels of per capita GDP, averaged over the 1998—2001 period (the data
is obtained from Datastream).
Our next variable attempts to capture search costs, broadly defined. INFORMATION
is calculated as the percentage of times a country is mentioned in another country’s main
business newspaper. The data is obtained from the Factiva database, which contains in-
formation about the extent of business press coverage available in each country. Following
Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2007), for each country dyad we record the number of arti-
cles in country i ’s main available business newspaper, that mentioned country j, or citizens
of country j, in the headlines. We divide this number by the total number of articles in
the newspaper which are related to all the (foreign) countries in our sample. Since we
cannot generate a reliable count of domestic articles, we set the INFORMATION variable
to zero for domestic country pairs (i=j ).
We consider two country-dyadic variables that capture transaction costs, broadly de-
fined. They measure the similarity of languages and of legal systems. LANGUAGE—
6The WVS survey question is “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or
that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?” The main diﬀerence with the Eurobarometer is that
the WVS only measures the overall level of trust held by citizen of one country, rather than bilateral
country-dyadic trust.
7We take into account that the Wordl Values Survey does not ask about trust in citizens of foreign
countries, so that the appropriate comparison is with the Eurobarometer trust measure expressed only for
citizens of the same country.
8The corruption index is the 1998—2001 average of the measure published by Transparency Interna-
tional (www.transparency.org); the rule of law index is the 2000 value published by the World Bank
(www.doingbusiness.org).
9Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2005) report an additional validation of the Eurobarometer measure
based on asking people about the likelihood that a lost wallet be returned, that further confirms its validity.
8
OVERLAP is the percentage of people who speak the same language in each pair of
countries, summed across all primary languages spoken in those two countries. This vari-
able is naturally set to 1 for domestic deals. The data comes from www.ethnologue.com.
LEGAL—DIFFERENCE is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the investor and
company are located in countries with diﬀerent legal origins; 0 otherwise. Following La
Porta et. al. (1997) we distinguish between four legal origins: common law, French-origin
civil law, German-origin civil law and Scandinavian-origin civil law.
To capture taste-based preferences, we consider two novel proxy measures. TOURISM
is the number of nights spent at hotels for holiday purposes by citizens of country i in
country j, averaged over the period from 1998 to 2001. This variable is set to 0 for
domestic deals. The data come from Eurostat, and are available for the stays of citizens
of European countries. EUROVISION, is the percentage of votes from citizens of country
i to the song of country j in the Eurovision Song Contest, averaged over the period from
1998 to 2001. This variable is set to 0 for domestic deals. The data are obtained from the
www.eurovision.tv website.
To measure the economic relationships between countries we use two standard measures
from the trade literature. EXPORTS is the volume of exports from country i to country j
(in billions of dollars), averaged over the period from 1998 to 2001. This variable is set to
0 for domestic deals. The data come from the UN World Trade (COMTRADE) database.
FDI is the volume of foreign direct investments from country i to country j (in billions of
dollars), averaged over the period from 1998 to 2001. This variable is set to 0 for domestic
deals. The data come form OECD.
2.4.2 Other independent variables
DISTANCE is the natural logarithm of one plus the distance between the venture capital
firm and the company. We identify the exact longitudinal and latitudinal coordinates for
each venture capital firm and company. This data is obtained from www.multimap.com.
We then use the geodetic formula to compute the distance in kilometers. This variable
diﬀers for each potential deal.
INDUSTRY is set of a dummy variables that characterize companies’ sector of opera-
tions. We obtain the data from our survey instrument, which gave the following choices:
Biotech and pharmaceuticals; Medical products; Software and internet; Financial services;
Industrial services; Electronics; Consumer services; Telecommunications; Food and con-
sumer goods; Industrial products (including energy); Media & Entertainment; Other (spec-
ify). These variables vary at the level of the individual company.
EARLY—STAGE is a dummy variable that takes values 1 if a company’s stage is
reported as seed or start-up; 0 otherwise. We obtain the data from our survey instrument,
which asked: Indicate the type of your first round of financing to this company (check one).
Possible answers were: Seed; Start-up; Expansion; and Bridge. This variable varies at the
level of the individual company.
INDUSTRY—FIT is the share of investments of a venture capital firm in the same
industry in which the company operates. This variable is constructed within the dataset
and is based on the above definition of INDUSTRY. This variables diﬀers for each potential
deal.
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STAGE—FIT is the share of investments of a venture capital firm in the same stage at
which the company is receiving financing. This variable is constructed within the dataset
and is based on the above definition of STAGE. This variables diﬀers for each potential
deal.
INVESTOR—FIXED—EFFECTS. We construct a set of 108 dummy variables, one for
each investor.
INVESTOR— and COMPANY—COUNTRY—FIXED—EFFECTS. We also construct a
set of dummy variables for investors’ and the companies’ countries.
PARTNER—MATCH is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the investors has at
least one partner of the same nationality of the company; 0 otherwise.
PARTNER—TRUST is the diﬀerence between the average trust of an investors’ partners
in the company’s country citizens and the trust of the investor’s country citizens in the
company’s country citizens.
3 The role of trust for deal formation
3.1 Methodology
We begin by asking what factors aﬀect a venture capitalist’s decision to invest in a com-
pany. This requires estimating the probability that a specific venture capitalist invests in
a specific firm. Formally, our econometric specification is given by:
DEALp = α+X 0nβn +X
0
pβp +X
0
iβi +X
0
cβc + εp (1)
Let i index investors and c index companies, let p = (i, c) index the investor-company pairs,
and let n index investor-company country dyads. The dependent variable is DEAL, which
is a dummy variable for whether, in a given pair p, the investor imakes a deal with company
c. The intercept term is denoted by α. The vector X 0n represents variables that vary at the
country dyadic level, namely TRUST, FOREIGN—DEAL, COMMON-BORDER, INFOR-
MATION, GDP-DIFFERENCE, LANGUAGE-OVERLAP, and LEGAL—DIFFERENCE.
The vector X 0p represents variables that vary at the investor-company pairs level, namely
DISTANCE, INDUSTRY-FIT and STAGE-FIT. The vectors X 0i and X
0
c represent vari-
ables that vary across investors and companies respectively. We discuss them below. Since
the key independent variables vary at the level of the country dyad (n), our logit model
clusters the standard errors of εp at the level of the country dyad. Clustering also implies
the use of robust standard errors.
To estimate the probability that a deal occurs, we use a logit model (we obtain the
same result using a Probit). To control for investor characteristics we can aﬀord to use
a complete set of investor fixed eﬀects (i.e., 108 dummies). This is clearly the most
powerful way of controlling for any eﬀects that are investor-specific, including, of course,
the investor’s nationality. To control for company characteristics, we use STAGE and
INDUSTRY. In addition, we use a complete set of company country fixed eﬀects. This
means that we control for the overall level of trustworthiness (e.g., on average Swedes
are trusted more than Spaniards). As a consequence our trust variables always reflect
relative trust (e.g., relative to the average level of trust, the Spaniards are more trusted
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by the French than by the British). Moreover, the country fixed eﬀects control for all
country-specific eﬀects, such as the legal and institutional environment.10
With over one thousand companies in our sample we cannot add a fixed eﬀect for
every company. However, to control even more finely for company characteristics, we also
consider a conditional logit model (Chamberlain (1980)). This eﬀectively includes both
investor and company fixed eﬀects, thus providing the richest possible set of controls. This
provides a semi-parametric estimation of the logit model, without need to estimate the
individual company fixed eﬀects.
3.2 Main results
The estimates from the simple and conditional logit models are reported in Table 3. In
column (i) we report the results of the logit estimation without any of the country-dyadic
control (except those related to geography, namely domestic and common border); in
column (ii) we add the country-dyadic controls. In columns (iii) and (iv) we report
the results from the conditional logit model, first without and then with country-dyadic
controls.
The most important result concerns the eﬀect of trust. We find that the coeﬃcient on
TRUST is positive and significant at the 1% level across all specifications. This clearly
supports the hypothesis that trust aﬀects the likelihood of making an investment.
In addition to being statistically significant, the estimated coeﬃcient measures an
economically important eﬀect. We focus on column (ii) in Table 3, which is our main
specification, although the results for the other specifications are very similar. The logit
regression estimates the odds ratio, defined as the ratio of the probability of success to
the probability of failure of the event (in our case of a deal being made). Consider a 1%
increase in the percentage of people that express high trust. An example (drawn near the
median of the trust distribution) is that 15.3% of Spaniards have high trust for Germans,
and 16.3% of Dutch have high trust for Germans. Such a 1% increase generates an 7.5%
increase in the probability of reaching a deal.11 Another example would be to consider
moving from the 25th to the 75th percentile of the trust distribution. For example, 10.5%
of British people highly trust Germans, which is at the 25th percentile, while 24.8% of
Norwegians highly trust Germans, which is at the 75th percentile. Moving from the 25th
to the 75th percentile of the trust distribution then corresponds to a 105% increase in
probability of reaching a deal–in other words, it more than doubles it.
Table 3 contains several other interesting results. Geographic distance is very im-
portant. The coeﬃcient for DISTANCE has a negative sign and is statistically highly
significant in all specifications. This confirms the notion that venture capital is a highly
localized activity, and that investing at a distance is something that venture capitalists
tend to avoid. In terms of the other geographic controls, we find that the coeﬃcients
10For example, one may think that the the decision to invest depends on the level of a country’s English
language proficiency, in addition to language overlap (see the discussion below). However, there is no need
to control for English language proficiency, since any such variation is already captured by the country
fixed eﬀects.
11At low levels of predicted probability, the marginal increase in probability is very close to the increase
in the odds ratio given by the estimated coeﬃcient.
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for FOREIGN—DEAL and for GDP—DIFFERENCE are negative and significant, as ex-
pected. The coeﬃcient for COMMON—BORDER remains insignificant, except in column
(iv). INFORMATION is positive and statistically highly significant. This result suggests
that search costs, broadly defined, matter. The result is even more surprising given the
fact that our information measure is only a rough proxy for diﬀerences in the amount of
information available. LANGUAGE—OVERLAP and LEGAL—DIFFERENCE remain in-
significant in all specifications. Throughout all regressions we find that INDUSTRY—FIT
and STAGE—FIT are highly significant, with an (expected) positive sign. This shows that
specialization is an important aspect of the venture capital market: to attract investments
companies need to fit into investors’ strategic preferences.
3.3 Alternative measures of trust
A potential concern is that, since our trust variable measures the trust of an average citizen,
it may not accurately reflect the beliefs of venture capitalists. That is, the average citizen’s
trust may not apply to the socioeconomic group that venture capitalists belong to.12 We
therefore recalculate our measure of trust for a subset of the population that is more likely
to correspond to the average venture capitalist. Since the Eurobarometer includes some
information on the socioeconomic characteristics of respondents, we restrict our attention
to respondents whose profile broadly corresponds to that of professionals. More precisely,
we consider respondents who are in the upper half of the income distribution, were at least
20 years old when finishing their last studies (meaning they have at least a bachelor degree),
and are between 34 and 50 years old–which corresponds to one standard deviation away
from the sample mean age for the venture partners from our survey. We find that our
socioeconomic refinement of the trust variable is highly correlated with the main measure
of trust (the correlation coeﬃcient is 0.99), suggesting that diﬀerences in the socioeconomic
group have little eﬀect on trust. When we use the socioeconomic refinement, instead of the
main trust measure, the results, for both trust and all other variables, remain unaﬀected.
Our analysis so far focuses on the investor’s trust in the company’s country. This
reflects the notion that investors are the main decision maker. However, entrepreneurs
also have to accept their investors. We thus also consider trust from the company’s
perspective. Company trust can be thought of as the trustworthiness of the investor. These
two measures contain strong elements of reciprocity and are highly correlated. Including
both measures in the same regression would thus be meaningless. Instead, we reran all
of our regressions substituting ’investor’ trust with ’company’ trust. The information
variable is our only other asymmetric variable, so we also rebuild it from the company’s
perspective. All of our results remain intact when we adopt the company’s perspective.13
Our main trust measure is the percentage of people reporting a high level of trust
in another country’s people. A natural concern is how robust our findings are to using
alternative measures of trust. From the Eurobarometer survey we can also obtain the
12For example, while it may be true that the French are hardly enjoying a high level of trust in the pubs
of East London, what we care about is what trust they enjoy in the wine bars of the City of London.
13Since both parties have to agree to the deal, it may be that what matters is the lower (or possibly
higher) of the two trust levels. We reran all of our regressions using the lower (and also the higher) of
’investor’ and ’company’ trust, finding again that all our results remained intact.
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‘average’ level of trust expressed. This means imposing a cardinal interpretation over an
ordinal measure, which is why we prefer not to use it in our main analysis. Still we reran
the regressions of Table 3 using this measure of average trust. In the basic logit model
trust is marginally significant at the 11% confidence level, and in the conditional logit it
is strongly significant at the 1% level.
3.4 Alternative explanations
We now discuss to what extent one can distinguish the eﬀect of trust from other explana-
tions. This is a challenge for the entire research on trust, given its inherently subjective
nature. The base model already controls for three important alternative explanations.
First, we control for geographic factors, using a very precise measure of distance between
each individual investor and each individual company, as well as controls for domestic
deals, common borders, and diﬀerences in GDP per capita. Second, we control for search
costs. Our information proxy is a broad measure of the availability of business informa-
tion. Third, we control for transactions costs, since language overlap and commonality of
legal systems are likely to aﬀect the costs of closing a deal.
There is a long tradition in economics of distinguishing beliefs from preferences, dating
back at least to the seminal works of Becker (1957) and Arrow (1973). Guiso, Sapienza
and Zingales (2006) also emphasize that culture aﬀects economic outcomes mainly through
beliefs and preferences. In our context, we would like to distinguish how much investors
‘trust’, based on beliefs, versus how much investors ’like’ other countries, based on taste.
Our main concern is to ensure that our central result on trust is not driven by investor’s
tastes. Liking is a subjective concept that is diﬃcult to measure, so we consider two
diﬀerent proxies. First, we use relative tourism flows as a proxy for taste-based preferences,
since tourism flows reflect patterns of cultural preferences among nations. Admittedly, this
is a noisy measure of preferences, but it has the advantage of being a bilateral measure.
Moreover, the country fixed eﬀects remove any common factors that may aﬀect tourism
(e.g., the fact that Italy has more tourist attractions than Denmark). Second, we exploit
data from the Eurovision Song Contest, which is a popular and uniquely European event.
It is an annual televised music contest among European countries, where each country is
allowed to send one candidate. The crucial aspect is that viewers from around Europe
vote for their favorite contestant (excluding their domestic candidate). While the absolute
ranking presumably depends on contestants’ quality, prior research has argued that the
relative vote ranking reflect patterns of how much people from one European country like
others (Clerides and Stengos (2006), Fenn et. al. (2006)).
Columns (i) and (ii) of Table 4 report the results of adding the TOURISM and EU-
ROVISION taste proxies to our main logit regression. We find that the eﬀect of trust
is not aﬀected by their inclusion, both in statistical and economic terms. Moreover, the
tourism and Eurovision proxies themselves are statistically not significant. Thus our main
results about trust do not appear to be driven by taste-based preferences.
Another questions is to what extent the relationship between trust and venture invest-
ments diﬀers from the relationship between trust and trade, identified by Guiso, Sapienza
and Zingales (2005). To examine this, we include measures of trade or foreign direct in-
vestments (FDI) as additional controls. One reason for doing this is that existing patterns
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of trade may facilitate venture investments, and possibly also proxy for opportunities.
Another reason is to test whether trust matters more for venture investment than for
general trade flows. However, there is also a caveat for including trade as a right hand
side control. The prior work of Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2005) establishes a positive
relationship between trust and trade. Including trade in our equation therefore introduces
multicollinearity, i.e., the model may be over-specified. With this caveat, columns (iii)
and (iv) of Table 4 report the results of adding TRADE and FDI to our main regression
model. As expected, we find that both TRADE and FDI are positive and statistically
significant. However, their inclusion does not aﬀect the significance of the trust variable.
This suggests that, even after possibly over-specifying the model, we continue to find that
trust matters. In fact, the evidence suggests that trust matters more for venture capital
investment than for aggregate trade and FDI flows.
3.5 Partners’ trust
So far our analysis measures trust using the venture capital firm’s headquarter location.
An intriguing aspect of our data is that we also have information on the nationalities of
the venture capital partners that work for the venture capital firm. We may therefore
examine whether having a foreign partner changes a venture capital firm’s likelihood of
making certain investments.
To examine the importance of partner nationality we consider two types of eﬀects.
First, we consider whether any of the partners of the venture capital firm have the same
nationality as the company. The natural hypothesis is that having a partner from the
same country of the company increases the likelihood of investing. For example, since
the British have low trust in the French, we ask wether a British firm with a French
partner is more likely to invest in a French company than a British firm with only British
partners. The PARTNER—MATCH variable captures this eﬀect. It can be interpreted as
representing a variety of factors, including language, trust, information and even personal
networks.
To further isolate the eﬀect of trust, we also consider a second measure. For every po-
tential deal, we calculate the average trust implied by the nationalities of all the individual
partners working for the venture capital firm. To return to our example, suppose that the
British venture capital firm had no French partner, but it had an Italian partner. Italians
have higher trust for the French than the British. Intuitively, the PARTNER—TRUST
measure of average partner trust allows us to examine whether the presence of an Italian
partner increases the likelihood that the British venture capital firm makes an investment
in the French firm.14
Table 5 reports the results with these two additional variables. The results show that
the composition of partners inside the venture capital firm indeed matters for invest-
ment decisions. Column (i) shows that PARTNER—MATCH is positive and statistically
14Not surprisingly, the average partners’ trust of an investor is highly correlated with our main investor
trust variable. Including both measures in the same regression would thus be incorrect. PARTNER—
TRUST is therefore defined as the diﬀerence between the average partner’s trust and the investor’s trust, so
that it captures the additional information contained in individual partners’ nationalities. As a robustness
check we also replaced TRUST with the simple average partners’ trust in the models of Table 3, finding
that this substitution does not aﬀect any of our results.
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highly significant, indicating that the presence of a foreign partner with the same nation-
ality as the company directly increases the likelihood of a deal. Column (ii) shows that
PARTNER—TRUST is also positive and statistically highly significant, suggesting that the
more indirect eﬀect of the national composition of partners also aﬀects investment deci-
sions. Since these two variables measure somewhat distinct concepts, column (iii) reports
the results of including both, showing that both variables continue to be positive and
significant. Moreover, the statistical and economic significance of the main trust variable
is barely aﬀected by the inclusion of these additional partner measures.15
We believe that these results give us a deeper understanding of the economic impor-
tance of trust. Our data allows us to identify the economic eﬀect of trust at a rather fine
level of detail. The fact that we continue to find significant eﬀects of trust when looking
at variation of partners within firms, provides strong evidence for the importance of trust
for investment.
3.6 Further robustness
In defining the sample of potential deals, we deliberately refrain from imposing restrictions
on the set of admissible potential deals, other than requiring that the venture capital
firm was in existence at the time that the company was seeking funding. This means
that we let the econometric model determine what matches are more or less likely. An
alternative approach is to impose additional restrictions on the set of admissible potential
deals, making assumptions about which pairs have a zero probability of resulting in a
deal. While we prefer not to make such assumptions for the main model, we also want
to consider imposing some additional restrictions to make sure that our results are not
driven by our sample construction criteria.
First, we note that not all venture capital firms make investments abroad. Public
venture capitalist are sometimes not allowed to invest abroad, others may have a preference
for not doing so. As a robustness check we consider the sub-sample of deals that involve
only those venture capitalist that make at least one investment abroad. We re-estimate
our results from Table 3 for this sub-sample of deals and find that none of our results are
aﬀected.
Second, we observe that some of the venture capital firms in our sample never invest in
certain sectors, or never invest at certain stages. We therefore exclude all those potential
deals for which the investor never invests in a company’s sector or stage. Again find
that none of our results are aﬀected by this restriction. We then combine these three
restrictions on foreign, sector, and stage investments–excluding potential deals where the
investor is never investing abroad or in a company’s sector or stage–and again find that
the joint restrictions do not aﬀect our results.
Our data contains investors from 15 countries but companies from 18 countries. To
make sure that this imbalance does not aﬀect any of the results, we rerun all of our results
eliminating the companies from the three non-EU countries (Norway, Switzerland, and
the US), but find that this did not aﬀect any of our results.
15The PARTNER—MATCH and PARTNER—TRUST variables also have a sizeable eﬀect of the proba-
bility of closing a deal. The presence of a partner of the same nationality of the company increases the
odds ratio sixfold, and an increase of 1% in PARTNERS—TRUST increases the odds ratio by 8%.
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The construction of our sample involves multiple observations for the same company.
One concern may be that the standard independence assumption of the logit model may
be violated in this context.16 We rerun our logit regressions clustering standard errors by
company instead of country-dyad, finding that this does not reduce statistical significance
levels. We also consider two-dimensional clustering, by company and investor, as suggested
by Thompson (2006). We find again that this does not reduce the sign or statistical
significance levels of any coeﬃcient.
A few of the companies in our sample make multiple deals with diﬀerent investors.
Instead of conditioning the conditional logit model on individual companies, we can con-
dition on individual deals. This even more fine-grained approach does not aﬀect any of
our results.
Our unit of analysis is the potential deal, but our key dependent variable, TRUST,
varies at a higher level of aggregation, namely the country-dyad. Our base specification
thus clusters by country-dyads. As an additional robustness check we consider aggregating
the data to the level of the country-dyads. This involves a considerable loss of information,
since we have to discard most of the micro-level information. Still, we consider a Poisson
model–using a negative binomial model yields similar results–where the dependent vari-
able is the number of deals in each country dyad, and the independent variables are just
the country-dyad controls. We find that the coeﬃcient on trust continues to be significant
at the 1% level. This suggests that our key results hold irrespective of the unit of analysis
used.
The prior social capital literature argues that trust among nations is related to the
history of wars, to religious similarities, and even to genetic similarities (Guiso, Sapienza
and Zingales (2005)). These variables have no obvious connection to venture capital
investments, and there is a considerable risk of over-specifying the model, because these
variables have been shown to be correlated with trust. Still, as a robustness check we
confirm that the main eﬀect of trust continues to hold even after controlling for these
additional factors.
Finally, just in case one is still worried that there remain any unobserved peculiarities
in our data that drive the results, we construct a falsification exercise. Instead of giving
each investor and company its true country identity, we randomly assign it. Based on these
false identities, we recalculate all the country-dyadic variables. The coeﬃcient of TRUST
in our main regressions becomes utterly insignificant, providing further reassurance that
our main result is not an artifact of the sample, but reflects a real and robust economic
phenomenon.
4 The role of trust for contracts
4.1 Motivation
In this section we examine the relationship between trust and contracts. The results from
the previous section raise the question of whether contracts can overcome a lack of trust.
A large theory literature suggests that sophisticated contracts may address problems of
16This is not an issue for the conditional logit model, which directly accounts for the interdependence of
observations within groups.
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asymmetric information.17 A natural hypothesis is that parties have an incentive to write
more sophisticated contracts if there is an underlying lack of trust, so that contracts
can be thought of as a remedy to address trust problems. An alternative hypothesis
is that writing sophisticated contracts is only worth the eﬀort when parties share high
trust, and that in low trust situations parties prefer simpler contracts. This alternative
hypothesis relates to the recent work of Hart and Moore (2007), which emphasizes the
importance of a common understanding of contractual terms. The key diﬀerence between
the two hypotheses concerns the credibility of sophisticated contracts. When trust and
contracts are substitutes, the contracting parties believe that sophisticated contracts work,
and have a greater need for them in situations of low trust. When trust and contracts
are complements, instead, lack of trust creates doubt about the value of sophisticated
contracting. Remember also that we are looking at generalized trust. The two hypotheses
therefore do not concern the inter-personal trust among contracting parties, but the general
trust they have for citizens of their countries, which includes trust in their legal systems
and institutions.18
We test these alternative hypotheses in the context of venture capital, where we can
draw on a prior literature that already establishes the importance of sophisticated contrac-
tual arrangements. The theoretical work of Dessein (2005) and Hellmann (2006) explains
how simple control structures may give too much power either to the investor or the en-
trepreneur, and how contingent control structures can achieve more balanced and eﬃcient
outcomes. The empirical work of Kaplan and Strömberg (2003) and Kaplan, Martel and
Strömberg (2003) documents the use of these contingent control rights. They note that in
practice it can be quite diﬃcult to specify and verify these contingencies. This suggests
that contingent control rights are a suitable contractual feature to focus on in our context.
We examine four contingent control rights, pertaining to the composition of the board of
directors, the allocation of voting rights, the decision to liquidate the company’s assets,
and the ability to terminate the founders’ employment contract. These control rights all
address major areas of potential conflict between investors and entrepreneurs (Sahlman
(1990)).
4.2 Estimation results
To analyze contracts, our unit of analysis is no longer the sample of all potential deals,
but the sample of realized deals. Each of our four contingent control rights variables is
a dummy variable, so that we use a logit model (using a Probit model does not change
our results). We also create a simple index of contingent control rights, which counts the
number of control rights used, for which we use a Poisson model. Formally, our econometric
specification is given by:
17See Stiglitz (2000) for an overview. The work of Chen (2000) and Casadesus-Masanell (2004) focuses
more specifically on trust.
18A prior literature examines interactions between contracts and personalized trust. Greif (1993, 2006)
and McMillan and Woodruﬀ (2002) suggest that trust and contracts are substitutes, arguing that long-term
relationships becomes more important when the legal system makes formal contracting diﬃcult. Poppo
and Zenger (2002), however, provide evidence that suggests that relationships and contracts can also be
complements.
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Contractr = α+X 0nβn +X
0
rβr +X
0
iβi +X
0
cβc + εp (2)
where r = (i, c) indexes the realized investor-company pairs. The dependent variables are
CONTINGENT—BOARD—RIGHTS, CONTINGENT—VOTING—RIGHTS, CONTINGENT—
LIQUIDATION—RIGHTS, CONTINGENT—TERMINATION—RIGHTS, and their sum-
mary index, CONTINGENT—CONTROL—RIGHTS. The X vectors represents the same
variables as in Section 3, with two exceptions. First, because the sample of realized deals is
much smaller, adding investor fixed eﬀect would clearly over-specify the model. Therefore,
the X 0i vector now represents investor country fixed eﬀects. Second, we noted above that
the information variable captures search costs that aﬀect deal formation. In this section
we are focusing on the next stage of the investment process, where the two parties have
already found each other, so we omit INFORMATION from the Xc vector.19
Table 6, where each column represents a diﬀerent dependent variable, reports our
findings. The most important result is that the coeﬃcient of TRUST is positive and
statistically significant for all five dependent variables. This result is not consistent with
the ‘substitutes’ hypothesis, where contingent contracts are used to address lack of trust.
Instead, it is consistent with the ‘complements’ hypothesis, where trust is a prerequisite
for sophisticated contracting. We believe that this is a new and intriguing result.
In Table 6 the coeﬃcients for FOREIGN—DEAL are positive and statistically signif-
icant in almost all regressions, while those of COMMON—BORDER are mostly negative
and statistically significant. One might expect foreign deals to involve greater uncertainty
and asymmetric information. Yet, we find that contingent controls rights are used less
often for domestic deals (and deals with neighboring countries). This finding is consistent
with the received wisdom in the literature that sophisticated contracts help align asym-
metries. Interestingly, the results for TRUST and FOREIGN—DEAL point in diﬀerent
directions. Both foreign deals and higher trust are associated with more contingent con-
tracts. This implies that, if the only problem is that a deal is with a foreign counterpart,
then sophisticated contracts can be used to address those asymmetries. However, if there
is a more fundamental trust problem, simpler contracts are preferred. This suggests that
lack of trust is a diﬀerent issue than the standard problem of asymmetric information that
has dominated much the financial economics literature so far.
None of the other controls variables have systematic significant eﬀects that persists
across the various dependent variables, although diﬀerent variables are statistically sig-
nificant in individual regressions. One possible reason for this is that multi-colinearity
is stronger in the realized deals sample, which consists of deals that were formed partly
for their country-dyadic characteristics. Indeed, the correlation among the country-dyadic
variables is larger in this sample than in Table 2.
19Since the realized deal sample consists of deals that were formed partly for their country-dyadic
characteristics, the correlation coeﬃcients among the country-dyadic variables are typically larger than
in Table 2. This means that multi-collinearity might be an even stronger problem in the realized deals
sample.
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4.3 Endogenous selection
Our interpretation of the main trust coeﬃcient is based on examining variations in trust
across a set deals that are assumed to be otherwise comparable. Our relatively fined-
grained control variables give us some confidence in the assumption that those deals are
comparable in terms of their observable characteristics. The question remains whether
our results could be driven by selection on unobservables. For example, it could be that
the only investments that are made in low trust situations are simpler, less risky deals
that require fewer contingent control rights. Since we cannot observe the business nature
of a deal, we may incorrectly attribute to trust what is in eﬀect due to an (unobservable)
selection eﬀect.
To address concerns about selection on unobservables, we estimate a Heckman selec-
tion model. The selection equation is given by (1) and the outcome equation by (2).
The econometric identification of the system is obtained by one ’excluded’ variable that
is unique to the selection equation. This variable is INFORMATION, which captures as-
pects of the search process that precede the contracting stage. At the time of contracting,
it is reasonale to assume that the amount of press coverage is no longer relevant, since
by then the two parties have already found each other. Put diﬀerently, the basic infor-
mational problem that investors may have, i.e. limited awareness about country-specific
opportunities, has already been solved by then. In addition, we note that the investor
fixed eﬀects further help with econometric identification, since they also appear only in
the outcome regression. Because of the large number of observations (over 100,000 in the
selection equation) and control variables (including over 100 dummy variables), we could
only achieve convergence in STATA by imposing two simplifications. First, we have to
use a linear probability model for the outcome equation.20 Second, we cannot achieve
converge for the maximum likelihood model, so we use the two-step estimation procedure
(note that this method still achieves consistent estimators).
Table 7 reports the results of the Heckman selection model. The most important result
is that TRUST remains positive and statistically significant, suggesting that our previous
findings are not aﬀected by unobservable selection issues. Interestingly, we also find that
the estimates of Mills’ λ are positive and significant in all equations, suggesting that
unobservable selection eﬀects have a positive eﬀect on contingent control rights. There is
thus some evidence that selection eﬀects may indeed aﬀect contractual choices, but that
they are not related to the main trust eﬀect.
4.4 Further robustness
We perform several robustness checks also for the realized deals sample. We use a probit
model, and we employ the socioeconomic measure of trust, the measure of trust from the
company perspective, and the cardinal measure of trust. We also add the two measures of
partner’s trust, and the tourism, Eurovision Song Contest, export and FDI variables. We
then cluster standard errors at the investor instead of country-dyad level and confirm our
findings. We also check that the results for contracts do not depend on any single country,
20To validate these assumptions we confirm that the linear probability model yields the same results as
the logit (and Poisson) regressions.
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or by the inclusion of deals with companies located in non-EU countries.
We find that the coeﬃcient of TRUST is positive and statistically significant in most
specifications, insignificant in very few specifications, and never negative and significant
(details are available upon request). In addition, we perform some additional robustness
checks that are unique to the realized deals sample. Because we only use investor country
fixed eﬀects, it is possible to add further investor characteristics. Building on our prior
work (Bottazzi, Da Rin and Hellmann (2005, 2006)), we introduce controls for the size, age
and type of venture capital firms, and for the amount invested in each company, but find
that this does not aﬀect any of the results of Table 6. We also add controls for whether
deals were syndicated, and whether the venture capital firm was the lead investor, but
again find that this does not aﬀect any of the results.
5 Conclusion
Economists often distrust explanations that rely on subjective beliefs. Trust is a subjective
belief, but so is economists’ distrust of trust-based explanations. Hence the importance of
empirically demonstrating the eﬀect of trust.
No single paper can definitively establish the full economic importance of trust. The
approach taken in this paper is to examine the eﬀect of trust in a tightly defined envi-
ronment, venture capital, where we can obtain micro level data. This has the advantage
that we can safely dismiss concerns about reverse causality, and that we can control for a
large number of alternative factors. The paper finds that trust has a significant eﬀect on
the investment decisions of venture capital firms, even after controlling for a host of other
variables, including investor and company fixed eﬀects, geographic controls, diﬀerences in
information, languages and legal systems, and even taste-based preferences.
Our paper opens up further lines of research. For example, our results on the com-
position of partners inside a firm suggests that it is worthwhile to examine under which
circumstances trust matters more or less, and how the presence of heterogenous agents
can aﬀect trust in teams. Another open question in the social capital literature is the
relationship between generalized trust and contracts. Our analysis suggests that they are
complements, not substitutes, but future research might try to examine why this is so,
and describe in a more comprehensive manner what contractual features are most likely
to be aﬀected by trust.
The analysis also suggests some tentative policy conclusion. Governments across the
globe are seeking to attract venture capitalists to invest in their countries (Bottazzi and
Da Rin (2002), Da Rin, Nicodano, and Sembenelli (2006)). Our analysis suggests that
investments ought to be expected mostly from countries with well established trust for the
recipient country. This provides some guidance as to what countries might be the most
promising targets for government that want to attract foreign venture capital investments.
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Table 1
Descriptive statistics
This Table provides the mean, minimum and maximum values of our dependent and independent variables; we do not
report these values for investor and company country dummies, and for industry dummies. For dummy variables we
report the frequency of observations. Variables are defined in Section 2.
POTENTIAL DEALS SAMPLE REALIZED DEALS SAMPLE
VARIABLE Mean Minimum Maximum Mean Minimum Maximum
Deal 0.012 0 1 — — —
Contingent Board Rights — — — 0.386 0 1
Contingent Voting Rights — — — 0.342 0 1
Contingent Liquidation Rights — — — 0.317 0 1
Contingent Termination Rights — — — 0.323 0 1
Contingent Control Rights — — — 1.296 0 4
Trust 20.402 3.680 71.600 43.448 7.120 71.600
Information 0.085 0 0.664 0.028 0 0.664
GDP Diﬀerence 4.617 0 34.352 1.068 0 25.546
Language Overlap 0.152 0 1 0.836 0 1
Legal Diﬀerence 0.285 0 1 0.872 0 1
Distance 6.720 0 9.322 3.829 0 9.176
Common Border 0.318 0 1 0.866 0 1
Foreign Deal 0.893 0 1 0.180 0 1
Industry Fit 0.144 0 1 0.365 0.017 1
Stage Fit 0.509 0 1 0.708 0.048 1
Tourism 13.929 0 168.339 2.602 0 84.807
Eurovision -0.430 —6.758 9.870 -0.008 —5.249 5.250
Exports 15.343 0 60.991 4.533 0 60.991
FDI 5.651 0 62.514 2.702 0 62.514
Partner-Match 0.028 0 1 0.038 0 1
Partner-Trust 0.059 —30.165 20.018 -0.731 —30.165 9.773
Number of observations 107,390 1,277
Number of companies 1,216 1,216
Number of venture firms 108 108
Table 2: Correlations
This Table provides pairwise correlations (and significance levels, in brackets) among the country-dyadic variables
defined in Section 2.
Trust Inform. GDP Lang. Legal Common Tourism Euro- Exports FDI
Diﬀer. Overlap Diﬀer. Border vison
Trust 1.000
Information
—0.219
(0.94)
1.000
GDP Diﬀ.
—0.357
(0.00)
0.073
(0.00)
1.000
Lang. Overlap
0.676
(0.00)
—0.191
(0.00)
—0.290
(0.00)
1.000
Legal Diﬀerence
—0.065
(0.00)
0.207
(0.00)
0.150
(0.00)
0.124
(0.00)
1.000
Comm. Border
0.031
(0.00)
0.314
(0.00)
—0.118
(0.00)
—0.018
(0.00)
0.377
(0.00)
1.000
Tourism
—0.173
(0.00)
0.086
(0.00)
0.091
(0.00)
—0.087
(0.00)
0.002
(0.62)
0.138
(0.00)
1.000
Eurovision
0.120
(0.00)
0.101
(0.00)
0.090
(0.00)
0.160
(0.00)
0.272
(0.00)
0.207
(0.00)
0.333
(0.00)
1.000
Exports
—0.207
(0.00)
0.457
(0.00)
—0.211
(0.00)
—0.190
(0.00)
0.065
(0.00)
0.531
(0.00)
0.391
(0.00)
0.056
(0.00)
1.000
FDI
—0.171
(0.00)
0.277
(0.00)
—0.047
(0.00)
0.001
(0.80)
0.058
(0.00)
—0.006
(0.00)
0.054
(0.00)
—0.069
(0.00)
0.518
(0.00)
1.000
Table 3
The main model
This Table reports results of logit and conditional logit regressions with investor fixed eﬀects for the potential deals
sample. The dependent variable is DEAL. Variables are defined in Section 2. Company controls are complete sets of
dummies for each company’s country, industry and stage. Columns (i) and (ii) report results of logit regressions discussed
in Section 3. Columns (iii) and (iv) report results from conditional logit regressions also discussed in Section 3. For each
independent variable, we report the estimated coeﬃcient and the z-score (in parenthesis) computed using (Huber-White)
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, clustered by country-dyad. Values significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level are
identified by ***, **, *.
(i)
Logit
(ii)
Logit
(iii)
Cond. Logit
(iv)
Cond. Logit
Trust
0.072***
(4.69)
0.075***
(4.70)
0.070***
(7.33)
0.067***
(6.98)
Information
3.964***
(3.59)
4.054***
(5.83)
GDP Diﬀerence —0.156**
(—2.35)
—0.149***
(—3.31)
Language Overlap
0.349
(0.73)
0.051
(0.12)
Legal Diﬀerence —0.052
(—0.18)
—0.239
(—1.08)
Distance
—0.224***
(—2.63)
—0.219**
(—2.56)
—0.394***
(—13.82)
—0.383***
(—13.30)
Foreign Deal
—2.142***
(—3.92)
—1.532**
(—1.98)
—1.513***
(—4.85)
—1.473***
(—2..59)
Common Border
0.136
(0.49)
—0.240
(—0.94)
—0.067
(—0.35)
—0.457**
(—2.29)
Industry Fit
6.928***
(28.44)
6.967***
(28.62)
6.679***
(27.38)
6.759***
(26.92)
Stage Fit
2.944***
(12.52)
2.994***
(12.92)
2.858***
(18.17)
2.923***
(18.17)
Investor Fixed Eﬀects Included Included Included Included
Company Controls Included Included Included Included
Observations 107,390 107,390 107,390 107,390
Pseudo R2 0.4995 0.5044 0.5987 0.6043
Number of venture firms 108 108 108 108
Number of companies 1,216 1,216 1,216 1,216
Table 4
Additional models
This Table reports results of logit regressions with investor fixed eﬀects for the potential deals sample. The dependent
variable is DEAL. Variables are defined in Section 2. Company controls are complete sets of dummies for each company’s
country, industry and stage. Columns (i) through (iv) report results of logit regressions which include the TOURISM,
EUROVISION, EXPORT and FDI variables, respectively. For each independent variable, we report the estimated
coeﬃcient and the z-score (in parenthesis) computed using (Huber-White) heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors,
clustered by country-dyad. Values significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level are identified by ***, **, *.
(i)
Logit
(ii)
Logit
(iii)
Logit
(iv)
Logit
Trust
0.083***
(4.81)
0.074***
(4.32)
0.062***
(4.01)
0.074***
(4.30)
Tourism
0.002
(0.24)
Eurovision
-0.047
(-0.58)
Exports
0.035***
(4.29)
FDI
0.046***
(5.56)
Information
3.834***
(3.71)
5.996**
(2.45)
2.997***
(2.93)
5.299***
(4.27)
GDP Diﬀerence —0.164**
(—2.28)
—0.188***
(—3.19)
—0.131**
(—2.14)
—0.138**
(—2.22)
Language Overlap
—0.239
( —0.43)
0.464
(1.08)
—0.202
( —0.33)
—0.352
( —0.47)
Legal Diﬀerence —0.138
( —0.45)
—0.105
( —0.28)
0.333
(0.96)
—0.239
( —0.72)
Distance
—0.214**
(—2.36)
—0.230***
(—2.56)
—0.215***
(—2.49)
—0.214**
(—2.48)
Foreign Deal
—1.174
(—1.46)
—1.398*
(—1.69)
—3.056***
(—3.31)
—2.842***
(—2.68)
Common Border
—0.324
(—1.17)
—0.393
(—1.52)
—0.733**
(—2.32)
—0.071
(—0.26)
Industry Fit
6.952***
(31.38)
7.055***
(24.55)
7.020***
(28.18)
7.090***
(28.21)
Stage Fit
2.982***
(12.16)
3.043***
(12.52)
2.998***
(13.00)
2.981***
(12.57)
Investor Fixed Eﬀects Included Included Included Included
Company Controls Included Included Included Included
Observations 97,618 91,162 107,390 101,697
Pseudo R2 0.4972 0.5224 0.5072 0.5138
Number of venture firms 102 108 108 108
Number of companies 1,216 1,195 1,216 1,211
Table 5
Partner eﬀects
This Table reports results of logit regressions with investor fixed eﬀects for the potential deals sample. The dependent
variable is DEAL. Variables are defined in Section 2. Company controls are complete sets of dummies for each company’s
country, industry and stage. Columns (i) to (iii) report results of regression models which include measures of the
PARTNER-MATCH and PARTNER-TRUST variables discussed in section 3.5. For each independent variable, we
report the estimated coeﬃcient and the z-score (in parenthesis) computed using (Huber-White) heteroskedasticity-robust
standard errors, clustered by country-dyad. Values significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level are identified by ***, **, *.
(i)
Logit
(ii)
Logit
(iii)
Logit
Trust
0.072***
(4.74)
0.082***
(4.96)
0.076***
(4.88)
Partner-Match
1.987***
(3.75)
1.577***
(2.74)
Partner-Trust
0.090***
(4.05)
0.064***
(2.81)
Information
4.291***
(3.74)
3.971***
(3.74)
4.001***
(3.83)
GDP Diﬀerence —0.149**
(—2.18)
—0.159**
(—2.41)
—0.154**
(—2.24)
Language Overlap
—0.201
(—0.35)
—0.038
(0.07)
—0.478
(—0.78)
Legal Diﬀerence —0.152
(—0.51)
—0.017
(—0.05)
—0.076
(—0.25)
Distance
—0.221**
(—2.55)
—0.223***
(—2.57)
—0.223**
(—2.56)
Foreign Deal
—2.198***
(—2.76)
—1.881***
(—2.38)
—2.462***
(—2.90)
Common Border
—0.233
(—0.90)
—0.241
(—0.94)
—0.230
(—0.89)
Industry Fit
6.931***
(27.19)
7.027***
(28.31)
6.978***
(27.21)
Stage Fit
2.998***
(12.71)
3.009***
(13.04)
3.000***
(12.86)
Investor Fixed Eﬀects Included Included Included
Company Controls Included Included Included
Observations 107,390 107,390 107,390
Pseudo R2 0.5085 0.5072 0.5099
Number of venture firms 108 108 108
Number of companies 1,216 1,216 1,216
Table 6
Contingent control rights
This Table reports results of poisson and logit regressions for the sample of realized deals. Column (i) reports results
of a Poisson regression whose dependent variable is CONTINGENT—CONTROL—RIGHTS. Columns (ii) through (v)
report results of logit regressions whose dependent variables are CONTINGENT—BOARD—RIGHTS, CONTINGENT—
VOTING—RIGHTS, CONTINGENT—LIQUIDATION—RIGHTS, and CONTINGENT—TERMINATION—RIGHTS. Vari-
ables are defined in Section 2. Company controls are complete sets of dummies for each company’s country, industry
and stage. We also control for investor nationality. For each independent variable, we report the estimated coeﬃcient
and the z-score (in parenthesis) computed using (Huber-White) heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, clustered by
country-dyad. Values significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level are identified by ***, **, *.
Index Board Voting Termination Liquidation
(i)
Poisson
(ii)
Logit
(iii)
Logit
(iv)
Logit
(v)
Logit
Trust
0.055***
(4.55)
0.197***
(3.12)
0.238***
(4.47)
0.188**
(2.15)
0.140**
(2.16)
GDP Diﬀerence
—0.028***
(—1.19)
—0.641***
(—3.36)
0.190
(0.96)
—0.031
(—0.12)
—0.695**
(—2.26)
Language Overlap
0.302
(0.60)
—4.904***
(—3.03)
3.884***
(2.56)
0.540
(0.39)
1.327
(1.03)
Legal Diﬀerence
0.126
(0.33)
2.254**
(2.14)
—1.970*
(—1.78)
—0.281
(—0.22)
—1.179
(—1.09)
Distance
—0.006
(—0.43)
0.033
(0.90)
—0.112***
(—2.73)
—0.017
(—0.55)
0.039
(1.20)
Foreign Deal
1.921***
(2.66)
0.410
(0.20)
10.343***
(4.42)
6.947*
(1.85)
6908**
(2.34)
Common Border
—1.019***
(—3.18)
—2.667***
(—3.40)
—1.119
(—1.55)
—2.386***
(—3.14)
—1.886***
(—2.75)
Industry Fit
—0.064
(—0.16)
0.557
(0.51)
—0.374
(—0.71)
0.125
(0.20)
—0.221
(—0.19)
Stage Fit
—0.044
(—0.15)
1.282***
(3.12)
0.107
(0.14)
—0.208
(—0.26)
—0.954*
(—1.88)
Investor Nationality Included Included Included Included Included
Company Controls Included Included Included Included Included
Observations 1,066 1,122 1,046 1,047 1,048
Pseudo R2 — 0.2240 0.2860 0.1829 0.1792
Table 7
Heckman selection model
This Table reports results of linear two-step Heckman regressions. Columns (i) through (v) report results of re-
gressions whose dependent variables are CONTINGENT—CONTROL—RIGHTS, CONTINGENT—BOARD—RIGHTS,
CONTINGENT—VOTING—RIGHTS, CONTINGENT—LIQUIDATION—RIGHTS, and CONTINGENT—TERMINATION—
RIGHTS. All variables are defined in Section 2. Company controls are complete sets of dummies for each company’s
country, industry and stage. We also control for investor nationality. The upper panel reports results from the outcome
equation and the lower panel from the selection equation. For each independent variable, we report the estimated coeﬃ-
cient and the z-score (in parenthesis) computed using (Huber-White) heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, clustered
by country-dyad. Values significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level are identified by ***, **, *.
Index
(i)
Board
(ii)
Voting
(iii)
Termination
(iv)
Liquidation
(v)
Trust
0.094***
(4.87)
0.019***
(2.79)
0.031***
(4.85)
0.028***
(4.17)
0.017***
(2.48)
GDP Diﬀerence -0.016
(-0.54)
—0.138
(—1.26)
0.012
(1.23)
-0.008
(-0.68)
-0.007
(-0.68)
Language Overlap
0.786*
(1.46)
—0.347
(—1.78)
0.529***
(2.92)
0.230
(1.20)
0.294
(1.54)
Legal Diﬀerence —0.401
(—0.11)
0.123
(0.94)
—0.314***
(—2.58)
—0.134
(—1.04)
—0.195
(—1.54)
Distance
—0.060***
(—3.05)
—0.005
(—0.80)
—0.026***
(—3.99)
—0.017**
(—2.55)
—0.006
(—0.84)
Foreign Deal
3.007***
(3.46)
-0.038
(-0.12)
1.311***
(4.48)
0.963***
(3.12)
0.796***
(2.59)
Common Border
—1.100***
(—3.99)
—0.236**
(—2.41)
—0.151*
(—1.63)
—0.284***
(—2.94)
—0.259***
(—2.66)
Industry Fit
0.724***
(2.98)
0.309***
(3.69)
0.070
(0.88)
0.246***
(2.97)
0.170***
(2.07)
Stage Fit
0.281
(1.62)
0.296***
(4.84)
0.074
(1.30)
0.083
(1.37)
—0.077
(—1.28)
Investor Nationality Included Included Included Included Included
Company Controls Included Included Included Included Included
SELECTION EQUATION
Trust
0.031***
(5.96)
0.034***
(6.74)
0.031***
(6.03)
0.033***
(6.45)
0.033***
(6.58)
Information
1.310***
(3.78)
1.672***
(5.09)
1.329***
(3.87)
1.640***
(4.96)
1.640***
(5.00)
GDP Diﬀerence —0.069***
(—5.39)
—0.070***
(—5.43)
—0.069***
(—5.40)
—0.069***
(—5.39)
—0.069***
(—5.37)
Language Overlap
0.248
(1.41)
0.184
(1.06)
0.268
(1.53)
0.174
(0.99)
0.187
(1.07)
Legal Diﬀerence —0.119
(—1.11)
—0.102
(—0.96)
—0.123
(—1.15)
—0.107
(—1.01)
—0.110
(—1.04)
Distance
—0.125***
(—13.23)
—0.122***
(—13.20)
—0.125***
(—13.26)
—0.122***
(—13.19)
—0.124***
(—13.37)
Foreign Deal
0.416***
(-1.59)
-0.453
(-1.77)
-0.421*
(1.62)
-0.469*
(-1.81)
0.664***
(3.76)
Common Border
—0.077
(—0.83)
—0.107
(—1.17)
—0.068
(—0.73)
—0.104
(—1.13)
—0.097
(—1.06)
Industry Fit
3.216***
(26.02)
3.207***
(27.84)
3.245***
(26.44)
3.201***
(27.52)
3.212***
(27.78)
Stage Fit
1.384***
(15.12)
1.375***
(15.64)
1.385***
(15.39)
1.366***
(15.31)
1.367***
(15.50)
Mills λ
0.583***
(5.15)
0.144***
(3.75)
0.096***
(2.58)
0.175***
(4.62)
0.144***
(3.82)
Observations 107,390 107,390 107,390 107,390 107,390
Realized deals 1,066 1,131 1,093 1,105 1,126
Wald χ2 2,401.90 2,529.18 2,581.89 2,403.53 2,437.88
